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INTRODUCTION
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA),I an amend-
ment to the Brooks Act,2 made the General Services Administration
Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA or Board) a bid protest forum. 3
* Senior Counsel for Technology, General Counsel's Office, Department of the Treas-
ury. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those
of the Department of the Treasury. Mr. Murphy was government counsel in several of the
cases discussed, including United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
Sysorex Information Sys., Inc., SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., Falcon Microsys., Inc. GSBCA
Nos. 10642-P, 10644-P, 12656-P, 1990 BPD, 153 (1990), appeal docketed, Falcon Microsys.,
Inc. v. United States, No. 90-1500, 90-1502 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 6, 1990).
1. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (codified at 40 U.S.C. § 759(f) (1988)).
2. Pub. L. No. 89-306, 79 Stat. 1127 (1965) (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. § 759
(1988)), amended by Pub. L. No. 99-145, §§ 961(c), 1304(c)(1), 99 Stat. 583, 703, 742 (1985);
Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2713, 98 Stat. 1175, 1182 (1984); Pub. L. No. 99-500, §§ 821(b)(1),
822-25, 100 Stat. 3341-335, 3341-342, 3341-344 (1986); Pub. L. No. 100-235, § 4, 101 Stat.
1724, 1728 (1988).
3. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2713, 98 Stat. 1175, 1182 (1984) (codified as amended at 40
U.S.C. § 759(0 (1988)), amended by Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 824, 100 Stat. 1783-335, 1783-344
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Presently, there are three primary bid protest forums: the United
States Claims Court, the General Accounting Office (GAO), and the
GSBCA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
reviews the decisions of the Claims Court and the GSBCA. For
some time, the general perception has been that GSBCA protest de-
cisions enjoy rough handling at the Federal Circuit. This Article ex-
amines the Federal Circuit's treatment of appeals of GSBCA protest
decisions and explores the ways in which the GSBCA and the Fed-
eral Circuit have disagreed.
Between January, 1985 and December, 1990, the Federal Circuit
heard sixteen appeals from GSBCA bid protest decisions.4 Of those
decisions, the Federal Circuit reversed the GSBCA in nine cases, or
56.25% of the time.5 The Federal Circuit ruled against GSBCAju-
(1986); Pub. L. No. 99-591, § 824, 100 Stat. 3341-335, 3341-344 (1986); Pub. L. No. 99-591
was a corrected version of Pub. L. No. 99-500. See statement of President Ronald Reagan
upon signing HJ. Res. 738, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 196 (Nov. 3, 1986) (explaining that
Pub. L. No. 99-500 had omitted text due to clerical error and President's signing of amended
provisions made them law). The GSBCA protest jurisdiction was originally designated for
codification at 40 U.S.C. § 759(h). Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2713, 98 Stat. 1175, 1182 (1984). It
was redesignated at 40 U.S.C. § 759(o. Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 821(b)(1), 100 Stat. 1783-335,
1783-342; Pub. L. No. 99-591, § 821(b)(1), 100 Star. 3341-335, 3341-342 (1986).
Since the creation of this protest jurisdiction in 1985, the GSBCA has interpreted its protest
authority as co-extensive with that of the GSA Administrator under the Brooks Act, including
within its jurisdiction protests regarding automated data processing (ADP) support services.
SMC Information Sys., Inc., 85-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 18,388 at 92,231 (1985).
4. For purposes of the analysis, this Article considers only appeals that were pursued
through decision and that resulted in a reported decision. Rule 47.8 decisions are not consid-
ered unless otherwise noted. Rule 47.8(c) of the Rules of Practice before the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit states in relevant part: "[u]npublished opinions and
orders are those unanimously determined by the panel as not adding significantly or usefully
to the body of law and not having precedential value." FED. CIR. R. 47.8(c) (1990). As of
January 22, 1991, the language of Rule 47.8 has been revised to read in pertinent part:
"[o]pinions and orders which are designated as not citable as precedent are those unani-
mously determined by the panel at the time of their issuance as not adding significantly to the
body of law." FED. CIR. R. 47.8(b) (1991).
5. See Data Gen. Corp. v. United States, 915 F.2d 1544, 1547-48, 1551-52 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (finding that Board erred in its interpretation of agency solicitation provision and by
imposing own assessment of agency data processing needs on agency); Vion Corp. v. United
States, 906 F.2d 1564, 1566-68 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding Board's dismissal of bid protest as
frivolous improper because Board's determination that protestor's motive was not genuine
does not make protest frivolous); United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 892
F.2d 1006, 1010-11 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (reversing Board's decision that IBM had standing to file
protest by finding that Brooks Act definition of "interested party" is narrowly confined to
disappointed bidders with direct economic interest); United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank,
889 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that Board did not have jurisdiction be-
cause transaction was not procurement contract); United States v. Electronic Data Sys. Fed.
Corp., 857 F.2d 1444, 1446-47 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that Board's determination that it
had jurisdiction over Postal Service procurements of ADPE under Brooks Act was erroneous);
Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., 819 F.2d 277, 279-80 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(finding that Board abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss protest following settlement by
parties); Electronic Data Sys. Fed. Corp. v. General Servs. Admin. Bd. of Contract Appeals,
792 F.2d 1569, 1579-80, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding Board does not have jurisdiction
every time procurement "should have been" conducted under Brooks Act but that its jurisdic-
tion is limited to where procurement "was" conducted under Act); United States v. Amdahl
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risdiction, by either overturning GSBCA decisions asserting GSBCA
jurisdiction 6 or by affirming GSBCA decisions limiting its own juris-
diction, 7 in seventy-five percent of the appeals it decided. The Fed-
eral Circuit expanded the GSBCA's expression of its own
jurisdiction in only one case.8
Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 395-98 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding that Board does not have authority to
settle rights of terminated contractor and reversing Board's finding statutory section, protect-
ing contractors who have performed under contract later rescinded by Board, inapplicable).
6. See Data Gen. Corp. v. United States, 915 F.2d 1544, 1551-52 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stat-
ing that Board has no jurisdiction to assess independently agency's judgment of its own data
processing needs); United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 892 F.2d 1006,
1010-11 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding Board's interpretation of "interested party" as those with
ability to protest as too broad thereby limiting number of protests Board can consider);
United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 889 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding
that Board does not have jurisdiction to hear protest regarding Dept. of Treasury's selection
of bank as financial agent of government, even though services rendered would involve use of
ADPE); United States v. Electronic Data Sys. Fed. Corp., 857 F.2d 1444, 1446-47 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (holding that Board does not have jurisdiction over Postal Service procurements of
ADPE); Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., 819 F.2d 277, 279-90 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (finding that Board abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss protest where parties
agreed to settlement); Electronic Data Sys. Fed. Corp. v. General Servs. Admin. Bd. of Con-
tract Appeals, 792 F.2d 1569, 1579-80 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating that Board's jurisdiction is
limited to procurements conducted under Brooks Act, not to procurements that "should have
been conducted" under Act); United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 395-96 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (finding that Board does not have authority to settle rights of terminated contractor vis-
a-vis government or to force government to "undo" services or goods delivered and
accepted).
7. See SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc. v. United States, 900 F.2d 1553, 1557-58 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (affirming Board's denial of two protests because Board properly gave broad discretion
to soliciting agency's determination of whether bid was materially imbalanced and deferred to
agency's conclusion of which bid represented lowest cost to government); Electronic Sys. As-
socs., Inc. v. United States, 895 F.2d 1398, 1402 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming Board's dismissal
by finding that contract aiding fulfillment of military mission fell under Warner Amendment
limitation of GSBCA protest jurisdiction); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. United States,
878 F.2d 362, 363 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (affirming Board's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction be-
cause subcontractor was not interested party with standing); Cyberchron Corp. v. United
States, 867 F.2d 1407, 1408-09 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (affirming Board's denial of protest for lack of
jurisdiction over cases involving military procurement of ADPE); Pacificorp Capital, Inc. v.
United States, 852 F.2d 549, 551 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming Board's dismissal of protest be-
cause it lacked jurisdiction over Department of Defense procurement critical to military mis-
sion). Three of these cases, Electronic Sys. Assocs., Cyberchron, and Pac/ficorp Capital involved
application of the Warner Amendment. The Amendment excludes from GSBCA's protest
jurisdiction any Department of Defense procurement of ADPE that either involves equipment
that is an integral part of a weapons system or is critical to fulfilling a military mission, pro-
vided the equipment is not used for routine administrative tasks. 40 U.S.C. § 759(d)(3)
(1988). There has been no disagreement between the Federal Circuit and the GSBCA about
the scope of this limitation.
8. See SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc. v. United States, 853 F.2d 1547, 1555 & n.*, 1556
(Fed. Cir. 1988). The court reversed the Board's denial of SMS' protest, finding that the
Board failed to consider changes in "acceptance test" in its analysis of reprocurement pro-
cess. Id. This failure, the court explained, reflected the Board's concern that it would be
making a de facto determination of an issue outside its CICAjurisdiction. Id. Such a determi-
nation was unmerited because implicit in the Board's authority to rule on bid protests con-
cerning ADPE is the power to make all findings of fact and conclusions of law necessary for its
decision, regardless of whether a particular finding may relate to controversies outside the
Board's jurisdiction. Id. The court also acknowledged that the amendment to the Brooks Act
recently expanded the Board's jurisdiction. Id.
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The Federal Circuit's treatment of appeals from the twelve boards
of contract appeals has been quite different. 9 The Federal Circuit
affirmed, in whole or in part, almost eighty percent of those boards'
decisions including all GSBCA decisions.' 0 This wide disparity sug-
gests that the Federal Circuit seriously disagrees with the GSBCA's
handling of protest decisions in general, and, in particular, with the
GSBCA's assessment of its own jurisdiction.
I. SUBJECT MATrER JURISDICTION
A. Brooks Act: Procurements Conducted "Under" or "Subject To"?
Under the Brooks Act," t agencies do not have general procure-
ment authority to acquire automated data processing equipment
(ADPE); rather, the Administrator of General Services has exclusive
authority to coordinate the purchase, lease, and maintenance of
ADPE resources. 12 The General Services Administration (GSA) ex-
ercises its exclusive procurement authority by directly conducting
ADPE procurements or by delegating procurement authority for in-
dividual procurements, as well as by "awarding requirements-type
contracts and multiple award schedule contracts for general pur-
pose ADPE, software, and maintenance services."' 3 The CICA, in
amending the Brooks Act, gave the GSBCA jurisdiction to hear pro-
9. The boards of contract appeals include those of the Armed Services, Corps of Engi-
neers, General Services Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Pos-
tal Service, and the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, Housing and Urban Development,
Interior, Labor, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs.
10. H. MARKEY, THE FIRST Two THOUSAND DAYS: REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 1982-1988, at 27 (1989). In this report, Chief Judge
Howard T. Markey reveals that, from October 1, 1982 through June 30, 1988, the Federal
Circuit affirmed 77% of boards of contract appeals decisions. Id. Of the remaining decisions
that it heard, the Federal Circuit modified 12%, reversed 7%, and vacated 4%. Id. FromJuly
1, 1988 to June 30, 1989 the Federal Circuit affirmed 80% of the boards of contract appeals
decisions that it heard. H. MARKEY, THE SEVENTH YEAR: REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 1988-1989, at 13 (1989). From July 1, 1989 to
June 30, 1990, its affirmance rate of boards of contract appeals decisions climbed to 81%. H.
MARKEY, THE EIGHTH YEAR: REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED-
ERAL CIRCUIT 1989-1990, at 15 (1990).
11. Pub. L. No. 89-306, 79 Stat. 1127 (1965) (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. § 759
(1988)).
12. 40 U.S.C. § 759(a), (b) (1988). Based on guidelines of the National Bureau of Stan-
dards (now the National Institute of Science and Technology), the Secretary of Commerce
provides standards relating to ADPE to assure the efficient operation and security of federal
computer systems. Id. § 759(d). This exercise of authority by both the Administrator and the
Secretary of Commerce is subject to direction by the President and to fiscal and policy control
by the Office of Management and Budget. Id. § 759(e).
13. Address by C. Phillips, Administrative Judge, GSBCA, The GSBCA & Automated
Data Processing Equipment Protests, presented to Judge Advocate General's School, United
States Army, 1985 Government Contract Law Symposium, quoted in Electronic Data Sys. Fed.
Corp. v. General Servs. Admin. Bd. of Contract Appeals, 792 F.2d 1569, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
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tests regarding ADPE procurements.' 4
The Federal Circuit, in Electronic Data Systems Federal Corp. v. Gen-
eral Services Administration Board of Contract Appeals,15 addressed the in-
teraction between the GSA Administrator's authority under the
Brooks Act and the GSBCA's protest jurisdiction. The Federal Cir-
cuit, strictly interpreting the Brooks Act, concluded that GSBCAju-
risdiction extends only to procurements actually conducted under
the Brooks Act, not to procurements which should have been con-
ducted under it.16 This case arose out of a Government Printing
Office (GPO) procurement for integrated printing and publishing
services to prepare, print, and distribute Army technical and train-
ing manuals.' 7 The GPO awarded a contract to Electronic Data Sys-
tems Federal Corporation (EDS).18 The disappointed offerors
protested to the GSBCA.' 9 Another offeror, the GSA on behalf of
the protestors, and EDS intervened in the proceeding.20 The
protestors asserted that the GPO contract was for ADPE, which
should have been procured under the Brooks Act. The GPO moved
to dismiss on the ground that the GSBCA lacked jurisdiction be-
cause the procurement was not conducted under the Brooks Act.
2
'
Because the dispute involved an agency and the GSA regarding the
Brooks Act's applicability, the GPO invoked another provision of
the Brooks Act, and thereby called upon the Office of Management
and the Budget (OMB) to resolve the interagency dispute.22
The GSBCA denied the GPO motion to dismiss for lack of
GSBCA jurisdiction. 23 EDS filed suit in the United States District
14. Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2713, 98 Stat. 1175,
1182 (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. § 759(f) (1988)). For a list of amendments to CICA,
see supra note 3. Originally, the GSBCA's protest jurisdiction was to last only until January
15, 1988. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2713(b), 98 Stat. 1184 (1984).
15. 792 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
16. See Electronic Data Sys. Fed. Corp. v. General Servs. Admin. Bd. of Contract Ap-
peals, 792 F.2d 1569, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The Federal Circuit also held that it has jurisdic-
tion to entertain appeals from GSBCA interlocutory orders granting injunctions. The court
proclaimed that "[i]njunctive orders from any tribunal within our exclusive appellate jurisdic-
tion fall within the jurisdiction granted to this court by § 1292(c)(1)." Id. at 1575.
17. Id at 1572.
18. Id at 1573.
19. Id
20. Id The offeror who intervened in the GSBCA proceeding also filed a protest with
the General Accounting Office (GAO). The GAO, however, dismissed the protest, deferring
to the GSBCA, and stated that the offeror could refile if the GSBCA concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction. Id.
21. Id The GPO asserted that the contract was not for ADP equipment or services but
was merely for printed materials and that the use of ADPE did not bring the procurement
under the Brooks Act. Id.
22. Id. (citing 40 U.S.C. § 759(g) (1982) (current version at 40 U.S.C. § 759(e) (1988))
which provides that when GSA and agency cannot reach mutual agreement, OMB shall review
and resolve dispute).
23. Id. (citing Xerox Corp. & Volt Information Sciences, Inc., Nos. 8333-P, 8336-P, slip
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Court for the District of Columbia seeking a temporary restraining
order and a preliminary injunction against the GSBCA and the GSA
on the grounds that the GSBCA acted beyond its jurisdiction. 24 The
District Court granted the restraining order, and, then, deciding
that it lacked jurisdiction, transferred the case to the Federal Circuit
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631.25
The Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the GSBCA, holding
that the GSBCA had no jurisdiction.26 The GSBCA and the Federal
Circuit's disagreement regarding the scope of the Board's jurisdic-
tion resulted from their differing interpretations of the Brooks Act
and CICA.27 The GSBCA rejected the restrictive reading of CICA
that excludes from GSBCA jurisdiction any case in which an agency
had not sought delegation under the Act.28 The Board stressed that
such an interpretation would allow an agency to bypass the Brooks
Act's requirements and thereby circumvent the Board's jurisdic-
tion.29 The GSBCA pointed to the Act's language mandating that
the GSA Administrator, directly or by delegation, coordinate the ac-
quisition of ADPE for federal agencies to support its position that
an agency's violation of the statute by failing to obtain authority to
procure ADPE does not lessen or restrict the Act's reach.30 In es-
sence, the Board asserted that for its protest jurisdiction to have any
substance, those procurements that should have been conducted
under the Brooks Act fall within its jurisdiction.
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the Board's analysis and con-
cluded that the GSBCA exceeded its jurisdiction in hearing the pro-
tests.3' The Federal Circuit stated that although CICA's
amendment to the Brooks Act expanded the GSBCA's jurisdiction,
op. at 13 (GSBCA Feb. 4, 1986)). The GSBCA reasoned that it, like other tribunals, had the
authority to determine its own jurisdiction and stated that it would determine whether the
contract should have been a Brooks Act contract. Md The GSBCA suspended the contract
between the GPO and EDS pending resolution of the protest. Id.
24. Electronic Data Sys. Fed. Corp. v. General Servs. Admin. Bd. of Contract Appeals,
No. 86-0353 (D.D.C. Feb. 21, 1986).
25. Electronic Data Sys. Fed. Corp. v. General Servs. Admin. Bd. of Contract Appeals,
792 F.2d 1569, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1986). When a civil action, on appeal from such an action, or
a petition for review of an administrative action is filed in a court without jurisdiction, that
court must transfer the action or appeal to the appropriate court. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1988).
26. Electronic Data Systems, 792 F.2d at 1578-83.
27. Id
28. See id at 1579 (finding that such interpretation is "tenuous at be:st") (quoting Xerox
Corp. and Volt Information Sciences, Inc., GSBCA Nos. 8333-P, 8336-P, slip op. at 14 (Feb. 4,
1986)).
29. See id. (stating that "[f]rom a practical standpoint, this interpretation would permit an
agency to intentionally ignore the requirements of the Brooks Act only to Foist the argument
upon this Board that we lack jurisdiction despite a clear and unmistakable statutory
violation").
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1577.
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it did not grant the Board jurisdiction over protests of procurements
that had not been conducted under the Act.3 2 To support this con-
clusion, the court emphasized that the statute's language gives the
GSBCA protest jurisdiction over the "'procurements conducted'
under the Brooks Act, not those which should have been conducted
under the Act."133 The Federal Circuit found the GSBCA's pro-
posed interpretation facially unreasonable because it created uncer-
tainty in procurement. 34 The court further noted that because
CICA's legislative history does not support the GSBCA's broad
reading of the statute,3 5 principles of statutory interpretation dictate
that the words of the statute should control.3 6
The court found support for confining the scope of the GSBCA's
protest jurisdiction in the Board's remedial authority.3 7 A forum's
authority to grant relief and its jurisdiction are necessarily intercon-
nected.38 Various statutory sections of CICA gave the GSBCA
power to suspend, revoke, or revise the procurement authority of
the Administrator or the Administrator's delegation of procurement
authority in particular circumstances. 39 The court proceeded to ex-
plain, however, that these remedies are meaningless where the Ad-
ministrator neither exercised his or her procurement authority nor
delegated any authority that the Board could suspend, revoke, or
revise.40 A forum cannot grant relief in those circumstances where
it does not have jurisdiction. As the GSBCA's power to grant reme-
dies can only be exercised where the Administrator or a delegated
agency has conducted a procurement under the Brooks Act, the
32. Id. at 1578.
33. Id (emphasis in original). The court asserted that this "unambiguous" and "literal
reading fits with the overall structure of the statutory scheme for settling ADPE disputes." Id
34. See id at 1580 (maintaining that Board's belief that its jurisdiction extends to
procurements that should have been conducted under Brooks Act would result in agencies
not knowing "until after the fact, even with a ruling in advance by OMB, that they had 'con-
ducted' a Brooks Act procurement").
35. See id at 1581 (presenting excerpts from various committee reports stating "[t]his
provision applies only to those... procurements conducted under the Brooks Act" to empha-
size that legislative history of CICA is consistent with Federal Circuit Court's literal reading).
36. Id at 1578-79 (citing Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
37. Id. at 1580.
38. See id. (stating that forum's remedial authority and its jurisdiction are "two sides of
the same coin. Thus, the remedy power expressly granted is a persuasive indication of its
jurisdiction as well").
39. Id. (citing 40 U.S.C. §§ 759(h)(2), (3), (5)(B) (Supp. 11 1984) (current version at 40
U.S.C. §§ 759(7)(h)(2), (3), (5)(B) (1988))).
40. Id The court concluded that in those circumstances where the Administrator had
not exercised procurement authority under the Brooks Act, "no statutorily authorized remedy
can be effected by the Board." Id (citing United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 390
n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
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GSBCA's protest jurisdiction is limited to those circumstances. 4'
In addition to limiting the GSBCA's protest jurisdiction to
procurements actually conducted under the Brooks Act, the Federal
Circuit in Electronic Data reiterated that the OMB, not the GSBCA,
has the authority to resolve interagency disputes over whether a
procurement is subject to the Act.42 The court proclaimed that "an
irreconcilable conflict" would result from recognizing a dual author-
ity by the GSBCA and the OMB to determine when the Brooks Act
applies.43 The GSBCA and the OMB, the court explained, would
potentially reach different resolutions because a GSBCA decision
finding the Brooks Act applicable could not take into consideration
the various discretionary factors on which the OMB may rely.44
Such GSBCA authority would override and essentially nullify the
OMB's dispute resolution authority-a result, the court points out,
that Congress had no intention of achieving by enacting CICA.45
The Federal Circuit highlighted these problems to support its literal
reading of the statute, and thereby restricted the reach of the
GSBCA. 46
In Electronic Data, the Federal Circuit invited Congress to revisit
the issue of GSBCA jurisdiction if it was not satisfied with the result
in this case. 47 The court noted that the statute only provided the
GSBCA with protest jurisdiction for three years, endingJanuary 15,
41. See id. (asserting that "[t]o find an implied power to grant relief from an inferred
grant ofjurisdiction exceeds the bounds of permissible 'interpretation' of the statute before
us").
42. Id at 1581. The court relied on the Brooks Act's language giving the OMB this
specific dispute resolution role. Id. (citing 40 U.S.C. § 759(g) (1982) (current version at 40
U.S.C. § 759(e) (1988))).
43. Id at 1582.
44. Id.
45. See id. (quoting House Report on CICA indicating that "[w]ith regard to OMB's au-
thorities under the Brooks Act, the bill does not alter the current procedures for resolving
conflicts between procuring agencies and the GSA's procurement office").
46. See id. (stating that conflict that would result from finding that GSBCA has authority
to determine whether procurements are subject to Brooks Act, "itself counsels against
stretching the statutory language").
The Federal Circuit's decision in United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387 (Fed. Cir.
1986) may have presaged its thinking in Electronic Data. The court in Amdahl twice noted that
the government was not challenging the GSBCA's determination that the contract had been
illegally awarded. Amdahl, 786 F.2d at 389, 398. In the decision below, however, the Treasury
Department argued that the GSBCA lacked jurisdiction, because Treasury had procured a
computer from the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation pursuant to the Economy Act,
31 U.S.C. § 1535. Id. at 390, 391 n.4. In response, the GSBCA held that where the inter-
agency transfer involves ADP equipment, the Brooks Act preempts the Economy Act, thus,
giving the GSBCA jurisdiction. Id. at 391 n.4.
Under its reasoning in Electronic Data, the Federal Circuit might have ruled that the procure-
ment conducted under the Economy Act in Amdahl was beyond the GSBCA's jurisdiction.
Even if this supposition is correct, however, the Amdahl result is likely still good law in view of
the 1986 amendments to the Brooks Act affecting GSBCA jurisdiction discussed below.
47. Electronic Data Sys. Fed. Corp., 792 F.2d at 1583.
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1988, and that Congress must review the matter if it deemed that
GSBCA protest jurisdiction should continue.48 The court further
maintained that "only by [Congress'] wholesale re-writing of the
statute" could the GSBCA have jurisdiction to hear challenges to
procurements that should have been conducted under the Brooks
Act.
4 9
Congress accepted the Federal Circuit's invitation and amended
the GSBCA's statutory protest jurisdiction through the Paperwork
Reduction Reauthorization Act of 1986 (PRRA), an amendment to
the Brooks Act.50 The PRRA ended the three year limitation and
made the GSBCA's protest jurisdiction permanent. 51 In direct op-
position to the Federal Circuit's holding in Electronic Data, Congress
expanded the GSBCA's jurisdiction by providing the GSBCA with
jurisdiction over protests involving procurements "subject to" the
Brooks Act, not only those "conducted under" the Act.52 By giving
the GSBCA the authority to determine which procurements were
subject to the Brooks Act, the amendment essentially granted the
Board the power to determine its own jurisdiction. 53 The amend-
ment also ended interlocutory appeals from Board protest
decisions. 54
Although this amendment was aimed at legislatively repealing
Electronic Data, Congress did not address certain issues which, in the
Federal Circuit's view, were necessary to resolve the GSBCA's juris-
dictional problems. In particular, it did not discuss the GSBCA's
remedial powers. Under the court's logic in Electronic Data, the
GSBCA does not have the authority to use its remedial power to
effect a procurement conducted outside the Brooks Act.55 A con-
48. Id.
49. Id. (emphasis in original).
50. Paperwork Reduction Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat.
1783-342 to -344, 1783-355; Pub. L. No. 99-591, §§ 821(b)(1), 822-25, §§ 821(b)(1), 822-25,
100 Stat. 3341-335, 3341-342 to -344 (codified at 40 U.S.C. § 759 (1988)).
51. Paperwork Reduction Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 824, 100
Stat. 1783-335, 1783-344; Pub. L. No. 99-591, § 824, 100 Stat. 3341-335, 3341-344 (codified
at 40 U.S.C. § 759(0(1) (1988)).
52. Id.
53. See id. (stating "[tihe authority of the board to conduct such review shall include the
authority to determine whether any procurement is subject to this section and the authority to
review regulations to determine their consistency with the applicable statutes. A proceeding,
decision, or order of the board pursuant to this subsection shall not be subject to interlocu-
tory appeal or review.").
The PRRA provided that although the GSBCA may request and consider decisions, opin-
ions, or statements of the OMB regarding the applicability of the Brooks Act to a particular
procurement, the GSBCA is not bound by such OMB determinations. Id- (codified at 40
U.S.C. § 759(0(5)(A) (1988)).
54. Id.
55. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (explaining that GSBCA's remedial
powers and its jurisdiction reflect each other and that because GSBCA remedies are to re-
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trary result would require reading an implied power to grant relief
into the amendment's provision giving the GSBCA "the authority to
determine whether any procurement is subject to this section."5 6
The amendment invites the type of conflict between the GSBCA and
the OMB envisioned by the Federal Circuit because it confers on the
GSBCA the authority to make implicit executive branch policy deci-
sions previously reserved for the OMB and the President.5 7 Neither
of these issues have been presented in subsequent appeals; they re-
main for future resolution.
B. Brooks Act: Who is Covered?
Since the PRRA's amendment to CICA, the Federal Circuit has
had several opportunities to address application of the Brooks Act.
In United States v. Electronic Data Systems Federal Corp. (Perot Systems),5 8
the Federal Circuit addressed the threshold question of which agen-
cies are subject to the Brooks Act. The controversy in that case in-
volved the Postal Service's award of a contract involving ADPE
studies to Perot Systems.59 The contract granted Perot Systems the
exclusive right to implement recommendations of the studies for a
five year period. 60 Electronic Data Systems and Planning Research
Corporation (PRC) filed protests with the GSBCA, challenging the
award.6' Motions by the United States and Perot Systems for a stay
pending review brought the case before the Federal Circuit. 62
Thereafter, the GSBCA issued a final decision, finding the contract
void for violations of the Brooks Act and Postal Service regulations,
solve, suspend, or revise Administrator's procurement authority, it is logically necessary that
Administrator or delegated agency exercised that authority under Brooks Act in order for
GSBCA to remedy violations of such authority).
56. Electronic Data Sys. Fed. Corp. v. General Servs. Admin. Bd. of Appeals, 792 F.2d
1569, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting Paperwork Reduction Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub,
L. No. 99-500, § 824, 100 Stat. 1783-335, 1783-344; Pub. L. No. 99-591, § 824, 100 Stat.
3341-335, 3341-344 (codified at 40 U.S.C. § 759(0(1) (1988))).
57. Compare Paperwork Reduction Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500,
§ 824, 100 Stat. 1783-335, 1783-344; Pub. L. No. 99-591, § 824, 100 Stat. 3341-335, 3341-
344 (codified at 40 U.S.C. § 759(0(1), (5)(A) (1988)) (stating that GSBCA has authority to
determine which procurements are subject to Brooks Act without being bound by OMB deter-
minations concerning Brooks Act applicability) with 40 U.S.C. § 759(e) (1988) (providing
OMB with authority to resolve disputes between agencies and Administrator and stating that
Administrator's authority under Brooks Act is subject to President's direction and OMB's
fiscal and policy control).
58. 857 F.2d 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
59. United States v. Electronic Data Sys. Fed. Corp. (Perot Systems), 857 F.2d 1444,
1445 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
60. l
61. Id. After Perot Systems intervened in the proceedings, the Postal Service moved to
dismiss for lack of GSBCA jurisdiction. The Board, however, determined it had jurisdiction
to hear the protest. Id at 1445-46.
62. Id at 1446.
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allowing the Federal Circuit to treat the matter as an appeal.63
The sole issue was whether, pursuant to the Brooks Act, the
GSBCA has protest jurisdiction over Postal Service procurements of
ADPE.64 Relying on the language of the Postal Reorganization Act
of 1970,65 the court concluded that the GSBCA lacked jurisdic-
tion.66 Under the Act, the Postal Service became the successor to
the Post Office Department. 67 Intending that the Postal Service be
run more like a business than its predecessor,68 Congress exempted
the Postal Service from all but specifically enumerated federal pro-
curement laws. 69 The Federal Circuit concluded that the GSBCA's
jurisdiction did not reach these Postal Service procurements for
ADPE, because the GSBCA has protest jurisdiction over only those
procurements subject to the Brooks Act, which was not one of the
specifically enumerated laws applicable to the Postal Service. 70
The Federal Circuit found the GSBCA's reasoning and conclusion
that it had jurisdiction unpersuasive. 71 The GSBCA asserted that
any exemption from the Brooks Act would be explicitly noted in the
Act itself, as demonstrated by the Brooks Act's specific exclusion of
Central Intelligence Agency and certain Department of Defense
ADPE procurements. 72 The Federal Circuit rejected this reasoning
and proclaimed that no specific exemption for Postal Service
procurements was necessary in the Brooks Act because, in the Postal
Reorganization Act of 1970, Congress had already excluded the
Postal Service from the Brooks Act's requirements. 73 The Federal
Circuit has yet to resolve which other agencies or quasi-agencies are
63. L This distinction between consideration of an appeal from a final decision and of
an interlocutory appeal is important because the PRRA specifically barred any interlocutory
appeals or reviews from GSBCA bid protest decisions. 40 U.S.C. § 759(f)(1) (1988).
64. Perot Systems, 857 F.2d at 1446.
65. Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (1970) (codified as
amended at 39 U.S.C. §§ 101-5605 (1988)).
66. Perot Systems, 857 F.2d at 1446-47. The court vacated the Board's decision and re-
manded with instructions to dismiss the protests for lack ofjurisdiction. Id. at 1447.
67. Id. at 1446 (citing Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat.
719 (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. §§ 101-5605 (1988))).
68. Id. (citing Loeffler v. Frank, 108 S. Ct. 1965, 1969-70 (1988) (quoting Franchise Tax
Bd. of Cal. v. United States Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 520 (1984))).
69. See Pub. L. No. 91-375, § 410(a), 84 Stat. 719, 725 (1970) (codified at 39 U.S.C.
§ 410(a) (1988)) (stating that "[e]xcept as provided by subsection (b) of this section, and ex-
cept as otherwise provided in this title . . .no Federal law dealing with public or Federal
contracts, property, works, officers, employees, budgets, or funds .... shall apply to the exer-
cise of the powers of the Postal Service").
70. See Perot Systems, 857 F.2d at 1446 (stating that neither subsection (b) of 39 U.S.C.
§ 410, which enumerates those provisions that shall apply to Postal Service, nor any other
section of Title 39 provides for application of Brooks Act to Postal Service).
71. Id. at 1447.
72. Id. (citing Federal Sys. Group, Inc., 88-2 B.C.A. (CCH) V 20,771, at 104,961-62 (1988)).
73. Perot Systems, 857 F.2d at 1446-47.
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEW[Vol. 40:1065
exempt from the Brooks Act, and therefore, beyond the GSBCA's
jurisdiction. For instance, the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency (OCC) has resisted the GSBCA's jurisdiction.74 The GSBCA
ruled that it had Brooks Act jurisdiction over the OCC; this decision
was not appealed.7 5 In another context, the GSBCA had an oppor-
tunity to address the federal agency status of the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Association; however, it did not ultimately reach a
conclusion.7 6 The continuing conflict between the Federal Circuit's
and the GSBCA's statutory interpretation makes the scope of
GSBCA's jurisdiction under the auspices of the Brooks Act unclear.
C. Brooks Act: What is Covered?
In United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank,77 the Federal
Circuit addressed the issue of what constitutes a procurement for
the acquisition of ADPE within the meaning of the Brooks Act.78 In
74. See Rocky Mountain Trading Co., 87-2 BCA (CCH) 19,840, at 100,406 (1987) (stat-
ing that OCC filed motion to dismiss, arguing that as entity using non-appropriated funds, it
is not subject to Brooks Act as amended by CICA). Three separate protests were filed by
Rocky Mountain Trading Company, Morton Management Incorporated, and Automated
Business Systems and Services and the court consolidated the protests. Id.
75. See id. at 100,406-07 (holding in favor of protestors that respondent, OCC, and thus
this procurement, is subject to Brooks Act). The court concluded that the OCC is a "Federal
Agency" for purposes of the application of the Brooks Act and CICA. Id. Furthermore, the
OCC's use of non-appropriated funds does not exempt it from the Brooks Act. Id. Thus, the
procurement process and the resultant contract to Texas Instruments are unauthorized and
contravene applicable law. Id.
76. See United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 398 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that
section 759(h)(6)(B) does not apply, and that Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association is
entitled to compensation equaling initial payment by Treasury of 1.2 million dollars). In this
case, the Department of Treasury purchased a used mainframe computer and certain related
equipment from the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association under authority of the Econ-
omy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1535, which authorizes transactions between government agencies. The
question of whether the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association was an agency was liti-
gated in the protest but not decided by the Board. Amdahl Corp. GSBCA No. 7859-P (May
16, 1985). Amdahl successfully protested the award. Amdahl, 786 F.2d at 389. The GSBCA
held that the award was contrary to the statute and revoked Treasury's DPA. Id. On appeal,
the Treasury did not seek to overturn the merits of the protest, but argued that the remedy
which GSBCA granted was contrary to section 759(h)(6)(B) of the statute. Id. There was no
discussion evaluating the federal agency status of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Associa-
tion by the Federal Circuit. Id. at 387-98.
77. 889 F.2d 1067 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
78. United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 889 F.2d 1067, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(holding that Board had no jurisdiction because transaction was not procurement of ADPE
within meaning of Brooks Act).
In a prior decision, Electronic Data Sys. Fed. Corp. v. General Servs. Admin. Bd. of Contract Appeals,
the Federal Circuit anticipated the problem of what qualifies as a procurement for the acquisi-
tion of ADPE. Electronic Data Sys. Fed. Corp. v. General Servs. Admin. Bd. of Contract
Appeals, 792 F.2d 1569, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The court commented that:
[w]ith the pervasiveness of ADP equipment and services and the imagination of the
bar, one could foresee a challenge before GSBCA to the bulk of government con-
tracts on the ground that the procurement should have been under the Brooks Act.
Indeed, in this case, it is asserted that the Brooks Act is implicated because the contrac-
tor will utilize ADPE in its performance.
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this case, the Department of the Treasury's Financial Management
Service (FMS) selected the Riggs National Bank to serve as a "Lead
Concentrator Bank" in FMS's proposed new cash concentration and
reporting system, "U.S. Cash-Link." 79 The GSBCA determined, in
a protest filed by Citizens & Southern National Bank, that the agree-
ment with Riggs was defective because it was not conducted pursu-
ant to the Brooks Act.80 The services to be performed permitted the
concentration of monies owed the government that were originally
collected at thousands of different locations.8' Furthermore, they
allowed for the compilation and distribution of detailed records of
these manifold transactions.8 2 FMS issued a Request for Proposals
(RFP) to initiate the selection process.83 The RFP included signifi-
cant detail concerning the level and types of services FMS was seek-
ing.8 4 According to the Federal Circuit, this led the GSBCA to
characterize incorrectly the agency agreement as one within the
scope of the Brooks Act.8 5 At the outset, the Board assumed that
the agreement between Riggs and FMS was an ADPE procurement
contract. Therefore, the Board focused on the ADPE requirements
of the RFP and rejected the argument that the agreement might be
classified as an appointment of a depository and financial agent pur-
suant to the National Bank Act.86
The Federal Circuit, however, disagreed and determined that the
FMS contract was not a procurement contract.8 7 Rather, it was an
exercise of the Treasury's authority, pursuant to the National Bank
Act, to designate a financial institution to act in its stead.8 8 This
designation was akin to the appointment of public employees, which
is not a contract.8 9
Id.
79. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 889 F.2d at 1068.
80. Id The GSBCA denied the protest, but determined that the agreement was subject
to the Brooks Act. Id at 1069. Therefore, it directed FMS not to proceed until it appointed a
contracting officer and received a delegation of procurement authority from the GSA Admin-
istrator. Id
81. Id at 1069.
82. Id at 1068.
83. Id.
84. See id at 1068 (stating that RFP notified eligible commercial financial institutions to
submit proposals for development and implementation of new cash concentration and de-
posit reporting system "U.S. CASH-LINK"). FMS determined that the adoption of the new
electronic technology could significantly improve the efficiency of the existing systems when
combined with the new CASH-LINK system. Id.
85. Id at 1069.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1070.
88. Id. The National Bank Act authorizes the appointment of depositories and financial
agents. National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 90, 265 (1988).
89. See Citizens & S. Nat'Y Bank, 889 F.2d at 1070 (stating that Treasury's action was not
contract even when terms and conditions guided employment relationship).
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The Southern National Bank holding is, on the one hand, extremely
narrow, offering little practical utility in other procurements, be-
cause the court addresses the issue within the confines of the facts
specific to this case. The analysis involved agency versus procure-
ment which, in the Federal Circuit's opinion, creates special circum-
stances that permit the actions taken to fall outside the Brooks Act
and, as a result, outside the GSBCA's jurisdiction.90 It is, on the
other hand, possible to interpret Southern National Bank in a broader
context. The Federal Circuit opinion seems to suggest that the inci-
dental use of ADPE will not automatically bring a procurement
within the scope of the Brooks Act. Unfortunately, the opinion fails
to clarify what constitutes a procurement over which the GSBCA
can exercise jurisdiction.
D. Ancillary Jurisdiction
Another jurisdictional question that arises in GSBCA protest
cases is whether the Board has jurisdiction over the ancillary is-
sues-those which are related to the protest but are not strictly
within the scope of the protest. In United States v. Amdahl Corp. ,9 the
Federal Circuit ruled that the GSBCA's jurisdiction was limited to
resolving those issues strictly within the scope of the protest; it did
not extend to those issues related to a protest decision.92 In Amdahl,
the GSBCA attempted to determine the respective rights of the gov-
ernment and the contractor in a contract the Board determined to
be void ab initio.93 The Federal Circuit overruled the GSBCA, to
hold that the GSBCA does not convene to determine the rights of a
terminated contractor in relation to the government.94 These mat-
ters should not be litigated in a bid protest decision and are not
within the limited jurisdiction of the GSBCA.95 Rather, the contrac-
90. Id. at 1069. The court stated:
Congress recognized that it is more efficient for Treasury to act through national
banks like Riggs and Citizens & Southern in fulfilling its statutory mandate of manag-
ing the nation's money than it is for the federal government alone to develop and
maintain a banking system for this purpose. When commercial national banks act
under the agreements that necessarily embody this congressionally sanctioned rela-
tionship, they do so as 'special agent[s] for the particular purpose required. .. .'
Branch v. United States, 12 Ct. Cl. 281, 287 (1876), aft'd, 100 U.S. 673 (1880).
Therefore, Treasury's designation of banks as depositories and financial agents
pursuant to sections 90 and 265 of the National Bank Act does not constitute a 'pro-
curement' of property and services within the meaning of the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended by the Brooks Act.
Id
91. 786 F.2d 387 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
92. United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
93. Id at 396.
94. Id
95. Id.
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tor's claim should be litigated in their traditional forums.96 Thus, a
contractor is entitled to his or her day in court, and any GSBCA
determination that a contract is void ab initio or voidable in a protest
hearing is neither enforceable nor conclusory in the contractor's
suit.97
A more recent Federal Circuit ruling, however, cast doubt on this
rule. In SMS Data Products Group, Inc. v. United States,98 the court
overturned the GSBCA's dismissal of a protest.99 The Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) awarded a contract for com-
puter services to SMS.' 00 Initially, C3, Inc. protested the award and
in the settlement of the protest, HHS agreed to compel SMS to con-
duct a new, more stringent, acceptance test.' 0 ' SMS failed the new
test, and its contract was terminated for default. 0 2 As stipulated,
the contract would be awarded to the next lowest bidder, and SMS
would be barred from participating in the new round of competi-
tion.103 SMS protested the denial, the GSBCA denied the protest,
and SMS appealed.10 4 The Federal Circuit, reversing the GSBCA,
directed that the contract be terminated with respect to the portion
that was not already performed. 05 In its analysis, the court wrote
that the GSBCA's jurisdiction is more expansive than the Amdahl
holding suggests.' 0 6 The court noted that the GSBCA was con-
cerned that it would be reaching beyond its jurisdiction by render-
ing a de facto determination of the validity of SMS's termination for
default. The Federal Circuit, however, remarked that this concern
was unjustified because "subject matter jurisdiction is a matter
96. Id
97. Id
98. 853 F.2d 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
99. SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc. v. United States, 853 F.2d 1547, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
100. lId at 1549.
101. Id The acceptance test was to include, at a minimum, certain items stated in an
attachment to the document. Id If SMS failed the enhanced acceptance test, it was to be
placed in default and the contract awarded to the next lowest bidder without further negotia-
tion, discussion, or opportunity for best final offers. Ide
102. Id. at 1550. SMS failed the new acceptance test because its equipment did not meet
the mandatory requirements of the contract. Id
103. Ide at 1551.
104. Id. at 1552-53.
105. Id. at 1556.
106. Id. at 1555. The court stated:
The board's approach may also have been colored by the fact that, in the past, this
Court had construed Congress' grant of jurisdiction to the board narrowly. Elec-
tronic Data Sys. Fed. Corp. v. General Servs. Bd. of Contract Appeals, 792 F.2d 1569
(Fed. Cir. 1986). The board's jurisdiction, however, has recently been expanded by
an amendment to the Brooks Act [citation omitted]. The Conference report makes
clear that expanded authority has been placed in the Board, whose jurisdiction and
functions shall be broadly construed so as to effectuate the purposes underlying the
original grant of protest jurisdiction to it.
Id. at 1555 n.*.
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which relates to the power of a tribunal to adjudicate a particular
controversy."' 10 7 Furthermore, the court stated that the GSBCA
maintains the power to decide bid protest controversies and to make
"all findings of fact and conclusions of law necessary to reach a rea-
soned decision."' 08 Thus, the holding in SMS can be viewed as a
retraction of the Federal Circuit's previous interpretation of the
GSBCA's subject matter jurisdiction in Amdahl. 10 9 As one commen-
tator concluded:
[I]f the awardee is a party to the protest, as is usually the case, a
ruling by the Board either that the contract is void ab initio or that
it should be terminated for convenience would necessarily deter-
mine the extent of recovery by the awardee on that contract, as a
matter properly within the Board's protest subject matter
jurisdiction.' 10
While this is a reasonable reading of the impact of SMS, it is also
possible to interpret the case in a manner that effects the Amdahl
holding less drastically. In SMS, a determination of the propriety of
the default termination was central to the resolution of the pro-
test."II In Amdahl, however, the ruling on the entitlement to funds
paid on the contract the Board voided between the government and
the contractor was ancillary to the determination of the propriety of
the contract award.12 Thus, Amdahl may still have validity in regard
to GSBCA findings and conclusions that are beyond its direct pro-
test jurisdiction and hence unnecessary for the resolution of the
protest.
E. Mootness
In Pacificorp Capital, Inc. v. United States,113 the Federal Circuit an-
nounced a general rule concerning whether a protest is moot. The
court held that the completed performance of a protested contract
before the protest reaches the Federal Circuit does not render the
appeal from the GSBCA moot.1 1 4 The court explained that regard-
less of whether a procurement contract is completed, express au-
thorization exists to allow the GSBCA to grant a successful
107. Id.
108. Id. The court stated "[t]hat a particular finding or conclusion may have some bear-
ing on a different controversy outside the board's protest jurisdiction is irrelevant." Id.
109. Coburn & Simchack, Federal Procurement in the Federal Courts 1987-1988: A Selective Re-
view, 19 PuB. CoNT. L.J. 14, 51 (1989).
110. Id.
111. See SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc. v. United States, 853 F.2d 1547, 1550 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (discussing SMS' termination for default).
112. United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
113. 852 F.2d 549 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
114. Pacificorp Capital, Inc. v. United States, 852 F.2d 549, 551 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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protestor an award of protest and bid preparation costs. 1 5 It con-
cluded that the "availability of such relief is enough to maintain this
as a 'live' controversy."'1 16 In a subsequent case, Federal Data Corp. v.
United States,117 however, the court issued a caveat to this general
rule. Should the protestor cease to be an interested party prior to
the conclusion of the protest, the possibility of award of protest and
bid preparation costs will not maintain the action as a live
controversy. '1 8
In Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Products Group, Inc.,' 1 the moot-
ness issue arose in a different context. 120 The Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) awarded a contract to Federal Data
Corporation; SMS Data Products Group protested. 21 The parties
before the Federal Circuit, including the original protestor, SMS,
the respondent, EPA, and the intervener, Federal Data, requested
that the court require the GSBCA to honor a settlement that was
negotiated and accepted. 22 The settlement called for SMS to with-
draw its protest in return for a substantial monetary payment from
the EPA (akin to the practice referred to as Fedmail), and leave un-
disturbed the contract with Federal Data.' 23 The GSBCA refused to
dismiss the protest based on terms, stating that the public interest in
maintaining the integrity of the procurement process overrode the
interests of the parties in terminating the litigation. 124 The Federal
115. Id. at 550.
116. Id
117. 911 F.2d 699 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
118. Federal Data Corp. v. United States, 911 F.2d 699, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
119. 819 F.2d 277 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
120. Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., 819 F.2d 277, 277 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (noting that interested party must have direct economic interest at time protest is filed).
121. Id at 278.
122. Id.
123. Id. The body of the settlement agreement filed with the joint motion to dismiss
states as follows:
This memorandum supports the joint motion of Protestor SMS Data Products
Group, Inc. ("SMS"), Respondent the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") and Intervenor Federal Data Corporation ("FDC") to dismiss this
protest with prejudice, reinstate EPA's Delegation of Procurement Authority and
permit FDC to continue performance under the contract, provided that for the pur-
pose of an award to SMS of its proposal preparation costs .... its costs of filing and
pursuing its protest and attorney fees, SMS will be deemed to have prevailed and
entitled to an award of such fees and costs.
SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., 87-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 19,637, at 99,402 (1987).
124. Id. at 99,400. The Board clarified its reasoning in the following statement:
The policy which strongly favors the settlement of cases so as to put an end to litiga-
tion does not require a tribunal to accept a settlement agreement when vacatur is not
equitable and would contravene other important public policy considerations ....
To permit such actions [settlements] would turn the Brooks Act procurement pro-
cess on its head and would disregard specific congressional intent to protect the pub-
lic interest by preventing agencies from running slipshod over statutes and
regulations.
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Circuit disagreed and noted that it is a firmly established custom
that the courts favor the voluntary settlement of suits over court
proceedings and judicial resolution. 125 Consequently, the Federal
Circuit held that the Board abused its discretion by refusing to dis-
miss the protest. 126
Thus, the Federal Circuit, in Pacificorp Capital and Federal Data
Corp., clarified the parameters of a moot cause of action. Pacificorp
Capital suggests that a pending claim for proposal and protest costs
is sufficient to avoid mootness. Federal Data Corp., on the other
hand, notes that a settlement among the parties to eliminate a pro-
test will render the action moot. Although the Federal Circuit suc-
ceeded in illuminating the nature of the mootness issue and its
relationship to procurement protests, it did so at the expense of the
GSBCA, for it overruled each of the Board's decisions to arrive at its
own conclusions.
F. Scope of Review
The standard of review employed by the GSBCA in an automatic
data processing procurement question does not defer to the procur-
ing agency's determinations of the case. 127 Furthermore, the
GSBCA standard of review does not require the use of conventional
standards previously employed in other types of protest forums. 28
Rather, the Board conducts its review of a protest by using the
"standard applicable to review of contracting officer final deci-
sions."' 129 Thus, the Board determines de novo whether the agency
violated statutes, regulations, or the delegation of procurement
authority. ' 3 0
While the standard permitting de novo review of protested pro-
curement contracts is well established, the extent to which the
Board should substitute its judgment for that of the contracting
agency is unclear. As a result, the Board is beyond the boundaries
Id
125. Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., 819 F.2d 277, 279 (Fed. Cir.
1987). The court stated:
In United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950), the Supreme Court stated
that: 'The established practice of the court in dealing with a civil case from a court in
the federal system which has become moot while on its way here or pending our
decision on the merits is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a
direction to dismiss.'
Id
126. See id at 280 (stating that Board abused its discretion in light of settlement reached
by parties).
127. Lanier Business Prods., Inc., 85-2 BCA (CCH) 18,033, at 90,495-96 (1985).
128. Id
129. Idt
130. Id
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of what is considered normal review procedures and has put itself in
the place of the agency's deciding official.' 3 '
A recent Federal Circuit case, Data General Corp. v. United States, 1 3 2
focused on the issue of the GSBCA substituting its judgment for
that of the implicated agency. 133 In this case, the GSBCA made lit-
de effort to disguise the fact that it was overstepping the accepted
bounds of review. In fact, the blatant language of the GSBCA hold-
ing establishes Data General as a particularly recognizable example of
the GSBCA's abuse of power seemingly sanctioned by the Brooks
Act. In granting the protest, the Board commented, "[w]ouldn't it
truly be 'incredibly stupid' to run back-ends on diskless worksta-
tions. . .?"134
The Federal Circuit responded to this language in an exception-
ally clear manner:
'Stupid' or not, the board has no warrant to question the agency's
judgment or to revise its delegation of procurement authority to
ensure that the agency's assessment of its 'true' needs is in har-
mony with the board's. The board has neither the authority nor
the expertise to second-guess the agency13-5
The court reversed the Board's decision and redirected the pro-
tested contract award to the original contractor. 136
The Board has gone so far in inserting itself into the agency's de-
cision making role as to conduct a mini, live test demonstration in
the court room.' 3 7 In substituting its judgment for that of the con-
tracting agency, the GSBCA exceeded the limits of its authority and
131. Madsen, Considerations in Selection of a Protest Forum, The World of Bid Protests, 1986
A.B.A. SEc. PUB. CoNr. L. 7. The author comments that "[t]his is not to say the Board does
not periodically appear to have stepped into the reviewing official's shoes and reevaluated a
proposal. In Systems Automation Corp., 86-1 BCA (CCH) 18,703, at 94,049 (1986), the
Board appears to have reviewed the complete technical proposal as well as testimony submit-
ted in camera in reaching its decision." ld.
132. 915 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
133. Data Gen. Corp. v. United States, 915 F.2d 1544, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The origi-
nal bid solicitation was issued by the United States Geological Survey. Id. at 1545. The con-
tract agreement spanned a seven-year period and specified that the government intended to
purchase, primarily for its water resource division, in excess of $125 million of ADPE. Id.
Data General appealed the decision of the GSBCA granting the protest of SMS Data Products
Group and Lockheed Missiles & Space Company. Id. at 1544.
134. SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., 90-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 22,799, at 14,497 (1990).
135. Data Gen. Corp., 915 F.2d at 1552.
136. Id.
137. Sysorex Information Sys., Inc., SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., Falcon Microsystems,
Inc., GSBCA Nos. 10642-P, 10644-P, 10656-P, 1990 BPD 193 (1990) (protest involving
Treasury's award of ADPE contract to Sears Roebuck), appeals docketed, Falcon Microsystems,
Inc. v. United States, No. 90-1500, 90-1502 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 6, 1990); Sears Roebuck & Co. v.
United States, No. 91-1022 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 16, 1990); SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc. v. United
States, No. 91-1060, 91-1061 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 5, 1990). Protesters alleged that a portable
computer offered by Sears exceeded the RFP's weight limit. Id. Treasury and Sears had re-
lied on literature from the computer's manufacturer for the product's compliance. Id. The
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consequently conflicted with the Federal Circuit's definition of the
correct standard of review.
II. INTERESTED PARTY
The Brooks Act empowers the Board to hear protests of disap-
pointed bidders who are "interested parties."' 1 8 An interested
party is defined as "an actual or prospective bidder or offeror whose
direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the con-
tract or by failure to award the contract."' 3 9 Despite the Brooks
Act's enunciation of this definition, there is a difference of opinion
concerning its meaning. As a result, one of the most litigated points
at the Federal Circuit concerning GSBCA protests is the issue of
who is an interested party.
The Federal Circuit has addressed this issue in three cases. The
first, MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. United States, 140 involved the
GSA's massive procurement which was to replace the Federal Tele-
communications System (FTS)-the government's entire long dis-
tance telephone system.' 41 Three offerors responded to the
government's solicitation, each with a variety of subcontractors. 142
Due to congressional concern that there would be one big "win-
ner," GSA was instructed to split the award between two offerors. 143
The teams led by U.S. Sprint and AT&T Communications, Inc. were
awarded the contract; the third team, led by Martin Marietta, was
the sole loser.' 44 MCI, a subcontractor to Martin Marietta, pro-
tested the award. 145 MCI conceded that it was not an actual of-
feror,' 46 but contended that it was an interested party because it was
a prospective offeror or bidder in the event of a resolicitation and its
economic interest was directly affected by the award. 147 The
GSBCA rejected this argument and dismissed the protest on the ba-
sis that MCI was not an interested party. 148
Board conducted a physical weighing of samples of the computer to determine compliance.
Id-
138. Brooks Act, 40 U.S.C. § 759(0(1) (1988).
139. 40 U.S.C. § 759(f)(9)(B).
140. 878 F.2d 362 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
141. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. United States, 878 F.2d 362, 363 (Fed. Cir.
1982).
142. See id (enumerating three contenders: AT&T Communications, Martin Marietta
Corporation, and U.S. Sprint Communications Co.).
143. Id. at 364.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id (noting that MCI did not submit its own proposal at any time during proposal
period).
147. MCI Telecommunications Corp., GSBCA No. 9926-P, 1989 BPD, 60, at 2 (1989).
148. Id. at 6.
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The Federal Circuit affirmed. 149 In doing so, it adopted the inter-
ested party standard applied to protests before the General Ac-
counting Office (GAO).1 50 Under this standard, an interested party
is one who has either submitted a bid or proposal, or filed a protest,
before the closing date of the solicitation.15 1 It is irrelevant whether
the protestor negligently missed the deadline for submission of pro-
posals, or, as in the case of MCI, the corporation deliberately chose
to be only a subcontractor and not an active participant in the bid
solicitation.' 52
The Federal Circuit faced a variation of the MCI case in Federal
Data Corp. v. United States, s5 3 its second important "interested party"
case. In this case, Federal Data Corporation submitted a proposal
but later withdrew from the competition.' 54 The Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration of HHS awarded a contract for ADPE to
IBM. 15 5 Wang Laboratories, Inc. filed a protest which caused HHS
to suspend performance and reopen negotiations. 56 Since the total
price and certain technical information related to IBM had been re-
leased to the unsuccessful parties, HHS established that, as a condi-
tion precedent to participating in the new round of negotiations, the
corporations must release certain proprietary information.' 57 The
purpose of this requirement was to place all vendors on an equal
footing.' 58 Federal Data refused to consent to HHS's demands and
ultimately withdrew from the competition.1 59 Subsequently, Fed-
eral Data protested to the GSBCA on a number of grounds, all of
which were either dismissed or denied.' 60
149. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. United States 878 F.2d 362, 368 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
150. Id. at 365. The court stated:
Our view as to the plain meaning of section 759 (0(9)(B) corresponds to the Ninth
Circuit's construction of 31 U.S.C. § 3551(2) (Supp. IV 1986) in Waste Management of
North America, Inc. v. Weinberger, 862 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1988). Section 3351(2) de-
fines an interested party for purposes of bringing a protest before the General Ac-
counting Office (GAO) rather than the GSA board, but uses language identical to
section 759 (0(9)(B). Using what we view as persuasive reasoning, the court in that
case determined that the would-be protestor, even though appearing to have a direct
economic interest, was not an interested party because it neither bid nor protested
before the close of the proposal period.
Id. (citing Waste Management, 862 F.2d at 1398).
151. id-
152. Id.
153. 911 F.2d 699 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
154. Federal Data Corp. v. United States, 911 F.2d 699, 701 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. The information to be released prior to the reopening of negotiations consisted
of three elements: the identity of all offerors in competitive range, the total evaluated price of
all offerors, and the total technical score of all offerors. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Federal Data Corp., 89-1 BCA (CCH) 21,414, at 107,932 (1988).
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Federal Data then appealed to the Federal Circuit on a single
count which asserted "that HHS's proposed remedy . . . violates
FAR 15.610(d), in that the disclosure of the prices and scores of all
offerors would constitute... an auction."' 61 The Board had denied
this count despite HHS's "violation of the letter of the FAR."' 162 It
reasoned that because HHS "endeavored to correct its admitted er-
ror in a way that affords equal treatment to all offerors on the re-
opened procurement, and allows for the most competition available
under the circumstances .... " it is a practical exception to the
FAR.16 3
Although the GSBCA denied the protest, it found that Federal
Data was an interested party. 1' 4 The GSBCA based its finding on
Federal Data's status as a competitor prior to its withdrawal from
the competition. 65 The Board concluded that Federal Data wanted
to compete for the contract, but was forced to withdraw due to the
government's violation of the FAR. Consequently, the GSBCA held
that Federal Data did not relinquish its right to compete, was an
interested party, and could pursue its complaint.' 66
On appeal, because it was no longer competing for award, Federal
Data sought only its proposal preparation and protest costs. 167 As
in MCI, the court determined that Federal Data was not an inter-
ested party. 168 The court explained that because Federal Data with-
161. Id. at 107,927. FAR 15.610 states:
(d) The contracting officer and Government personnel involved [in writtern and oral
discussion in connection with negotiated procurements] shall not engage in -
(1) Technical leveling (i.e., helping an offeror to bring its proposals through suc-
cessive rounds of discussion, such as by pointing out weaknesses resulting
from the offeror's lack of diligence, competence, or inventiveness in prepar-
ing the proposal);
(2) Technical transfusions (i.e., Government disclosure of technical information
pertaining to a proposal that results in improvement of competing proposal);
or
(3) Auction techniques; such as -
(i) Indicating to an offeror a cost or price that it must meet to obtain further
consideration;
(ii) Advising an offeror of its price standing relative to another offeror (how-
ever, it is permissible to inform an offeror that its cost or price is consid-
ered by the Government to be too high or unrealistic); and
(iii) Otherwise furnishing information about other offeror's prices.
Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 15.610(d) (1987).
162. Federal Data Corp., 89-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 21,414, at 107,930 (1988).
163. Id. at 107,932.
164. Federal Data Corp., GSBCA No. 9732-P, 1988 BPD 308, at 11 (1988), rev'd, 911
F.2d 699 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Federal Data Corp. v. United States, 911 F.2d 699, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting
that reasonable attorney's fees are included in "protest costs").
168. Id. at 703-04 (basing its decisions on MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. United
States, 878 F.2d 362 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
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drew from the bidding process prior to filing its protest, it willingly
conceded any chance of obtaining the contract. 169 Therefore Fed-
eral Data ceased to have the requisite "direct economic interest" in
the contract. 170 In order to establish the requisite direct economic
interest, the protestor must continue to compete for award at least
until it files a protest with the GSBCA.' 7' Federal Data's forced
withdrawal prohibited continued competition for award and it did
not seek enforcement of its protest.' 72 Thus, contrary to the
Board's decision, the Federal Circuit determined that Federal Data
was not an interested party.' 73 This case establishes that in addition
to being an actual offeror or bidder (or filing the protest before the
closing date of the procurement), the protestor must continue in
that role at least until filing its protest.
The third Federal Circuit case analyzing the interested party ques-
tion is United States v. International Business Machines Corp. (IBM).1 74
The dispute in IBM arose out of an invitation for bids issued by the
GPO. IBM, the fourth lowest bidder in the competition, protested
an award to Amdahl.175 The Board held that IBM had standing as
an interested party because it had a direct economic interest.1 76
The GSBCA based this finding on the fact that IBM participated and
expended resources in an effort to obtain the procurement. 77
The Federal Circuit reversed and in doing so, carved out a firm
rule for measuring whether a protestor, at least in a sealed-bid con-
text, is an interested party.' 78 The court held that in a publicly an-
nounced sealed-bid context, only the second-lowest bid has the
requisite direct economic interest where every competitor offers es-
sentially the same product or services so that bids differ materially
only as to price; the solicitation process is not challenged, and there
is no reason to believe that the second-lowest bid is unrespon-
sive. 179 The court held that IBM could not qualify as an interested
169. Id.
170. Id. (quoting 40 U.S.C. § 759(0(9)(B)).
171. See id. at 704 (holding that action in controversy may be brought only by "interested
party," i.e., one with "direct economic interest," who continued to compete without with-
drawing prior to filing protest).
172. Id.; see 40 U.S.C. § 759 (1988) (stating that party seeking costs must have standing to
enforce protest).
173. Federal Data Corp., 911 F.2d at 704.
174. 892 F.2d 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, (Jan. 17, 1990).
175. International Business Machs. Corp., GSBCA No. 9703-P, 1988 BPD 257, at 10
(1988), rev'd, 892 F.2d 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 892 F.2d 1006, 1011 (Fed. Cir.
1989), reh'g denied, (Jan. 17, 1990).
179. Id.
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party because its bid ranked fourth-lowest in a formally advertised,
sealed-bid procurement, it did not challenge either the solicitation
itself or the eligibility of the lower bidders, and every competitor
offered the same hardware.180
IBM, however, invites future litigation concerning the scope of
the new rule. The court suggests that the rule applies only in the
sealed-bid context,18 ' but other language in the opinion leaves open
the possibility that the rule will apply to negotiated procurements as
well.182
A recent GSBCA protest case' 83 addressed a question concerning
the scope of the IBM rule.18 4 In this case, three firms protested the
Treasury Department's award of a large personal computer contract
to Sears.' 8 5 Pursuant to the Federal Circuit's ruling in IBM, the
Treasury Department and Sears moved for a dismissal of protests by
all bidders with the exception of the bidder with the second-lowest
offer.' 8 6 A provision in the RFP stated that the Treasury Depart-
ment would make an award based solely on price if its contracting
officer determined that the offeror's products were essentially
equivalent.187 The award was made on price alone, the contracting
officer having made a determination of equivalency.188 The GSBCA
held that the chance of further rounds of competition after a protest
is a possibility; therefore, the IBM rule does not apply in negotiated
procurements. I8 9 This is in direct conflict with the position taken by
GAO, which has limited the zone of interested party to the second
lowest offeror absent a challenge to the acceptability of that of-
180. Id.
181. Id. The court referred to "formally (sic] advertised[,] sealed-bid procurements ......
Id. The implication is that the rule the court fashioned applies only to non-negotiable
procurements.
182. Id. The court noted that "tt]his is especially so when the solicitation invites sealed
bids .... Id. The implication is that the rule does not apply exclusively to negotiated
contests.
183. Sysorex Information Sys., SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., Falcon Microsystems, Inc., GSBCA
Nos. 10642-P, 10644-P, 10656-P, 1990 BPD 153 (1990).
184. Id. at 6 (asserting that in negotiated context, lowest-priced fully compliant bid cannot
be determined by price alone).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 5; see also Planning Research Corp., GSBCA No. 10697-P, 1990 BPD 224 (1990)
(reaching same conclusion that IBM rule applies only to sealed-bid solicitations). Administra-
tive Judge Neill noted that a contrary rule would permit all disappointed bidders to claim
standing because they had a direct economic interest in the contract. Id. at 2. This would
erode the direct economic interest limitations until it imposed no limit on protests at all. Id.
But see Unit Data Serv. Corp., GSBCA No. 10775-P, 1990 BPD 281 (1990) (reaching con-
trary conclusion by applying IBM rule to a negotiated procurement without discussion).
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feror's offer.190 This is the IBM rule. The Federal Circuit has not
yet ruled on this issue and a conflict between the Board and GAO
remains. As noted above, the Federal Circuit has viewed the GAO
position on the interested party issue favorably in a somewhat differ-
ent context. 191
The IBM decision enunciated an additional distinct element in de-
termining whether the party is interested. 92 This element relates to
the protestor's responsiveness to a solicitation for bids and is de-
rived from the statutory requirement that an award can be made
only to a bid conforming to the solicitation. 93 When a protestor's
responsiveness is challenged, the Board must, as a preliminary juris-
dictional inquiry, determine if the bid is indeed responsive.' 9 4
Technically, the responsiveness inquiry only applies to sealed-bid
solicitations.' 9 5 But, notwithstanding this general rule, the GSBCA
occasionally applies a strict standard of conformance to bidders in-
volved in negotiated procurements. 196 Because the same pass/fail
test of conformance to RFPs is utilized in protest reviews of negoti-
ated procurements as is applied in making a responsiveness deter-
mination in a sealed-bid contract, there seems to be little reason to
suggest that the Federal Circuit would not apply the same interested
party test to a negotiated procurement.
III. SANCTIONS
In Vion Corp. v. United States,'9 7 the Federal Circuit limited the
scope of the GSBCA's authority to dismiss a frivolous claim. Vion
protested an Army acquisition of IBM-compatible computers. 198
The GSBCA denied the Army's motion to dismiss the protest as
frivolous.' 9 9 During discovery, the Army filed a motion for discov-
190. Thermal Reduction Co., B-236724, 89-2 CPD 527 (1989); see CFS Air Cargo, Inc.,
B-238698.4, 90-1 CPD 315 (1990).
191. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. United States, 878 F.2d 362 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
192. International Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 911 F.2d 1006, 1012 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
193. Id.; see 10 U.S.C. § 2305(b)(3) (1988) and 41 U.S.C. § 235b(c) (1988) (requiring that
government contracts be awarded only to proposals "whose bid conforms to the
solicitation").
194. International Business Machs. Corp., 911 F.2d at 1012.
195. Id. at 1011; see alsoJ. CIBINIC & R. NASH, FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRAcTs 394
(2d ed. 1986) (arguing that conformity requirement applies to sealed-bid procurements pur-
suant to statutory mandate).
196. Sysorex Information Sys., Inc., SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., Falcon Microsystems,
Inc., GSBCA Nos. 10642-P, 10644-P, 10656-P, 1990 BPD 153, at 7 (1990) (applying strict
standard of conformance to negotiated procurement in protest filed post-award).
197. 906 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
198. Vion Corp. v. United States, 906 F.2d 1564, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
199. Vion Corp., GSBCA No. 10218-P, 1990 BPD 200, at 4 (1990), rev'd, 906 F.2d 1564
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
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ery sanctions, alleging that Vion's responses exposed "a deliberate
pattern of refusal to cooperate with the Board's [discovery] or-
der. ' 200 The Board dismissed the protest for two reasons: (1) the
protest was frivolous; and, (2) Vion failed to comply with the
Board's discovery order.20 1 On reconsideration, the GSBCA reaf-
firmed the dismissal, stating that it dismissed the action because the
protest was frivolous; the dismissal was not intended as a discovery
sanction.20 2
Congress authorized the GSBCA to dismiss a frivolous protest or
a protest which on its face did not state a valid basis to protest.20
The Federal Circuit, in Vion, held that Congress intended the word
"frivolous" to have the common meaning used in other legal con-
texts.20 4 A complaint well grounded in fact and law cannot be dis-
missed as frivolous. 20 5 The court further noted that conscious
interference with or delay in the Board's management of a protest
does not necessarily make the protest frivolous; bad faith does not
make a claim frivolous. 206 The Federal Circuit went to some length
to point out that the Board relied solely on the finding of frivolous-
ness to make its decision, expressly disavowing discovery sanction as
a basis for the dismissal.20 7 The clear implication of the ruling is
that the GSBCA lacks authority to dismiss any protest unless it is
frivolous or it fails to state a valid basis. The unanswered question
is whether the GSBCA has the authority to sanction a party for dis-
covery abuse.20 8
A recent GSBCA opinion interprets Vion as refining the GSBCA's
authority to dismiss frivolous claims, not as limiting its authority to
impose discovery sanctions. 209 In that case, one of the protestors, in
200. Vion Corp., 906 F.2d at 1565.
201. Vion Corp., GSBCA No. 10218-P, 1990 BPD 200, at 3 (1990).
202. Id. at 2-3.
203. See 40 U.S.C. § 759(f)(4)(C) (1988) (empowering GSBCA to dismiss frivolous claims,
but failing to define "frivolous").
204. Vion Corp., 906 F.2d at 1566 (noting that claim is frivolous when utterly without
merit; when not even colorable argument can be made in its behalf).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1566-67.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1568 n.5. The court noted that it did not have to address the issue of whether
"Vion could be lawfully sanctioned for past discovery misdeeds, or whether dismissal might
be justified for any future discovery transgressions." Id.
A previous Federal Circuit case involved a situation in which the GSBCA imposed discovery
sanctions against a party that refused to comply with a discovery order. United States v. Elec-
tronic Data Sys. Fed. Corp., 857 F.2d 1444, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The court, however, re-
versed on other grounds and, as in Vion, failed to rule on the propriety of the sanctions. Id.
209. Sysorex Information Sys., Inc., SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., Falcon Microsys., Inc.,
GSBCA Nos. 10642-P, 10644-P, 10656-P, 1990 BPD 1153, at 6 (1990) (reading Vion narrowly
to imply that the court did not intend to limit GSBCA authority to issue discovery sanctions).
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order to assist in preparing its protest, paid the awardee's former
consultant for privileged information concerning the awardee. 210
The protestor's conduct came to light during discovery when the
protestor produced the awardee's privileged documents.2 11 The
opinion states that the GSBCA reads Vion as applicable "only to sit-
uations in which a dismissal is requested based on alleged bad
faith." 212 The Board explained that Vion, if read too broadly, would
deny the Board authority to manage its docket in an orderly fash-
ion.2 13 Thus, the GSBCA suggests that Vion does not alter its au-
thority to employ discovery sanctions.
CONCLUSION
It certainly appears that, in the view of the Federal Circuit, the
GSBCA has been overly expansive in interpreting its protest juris-
diction. While at times suggesting that its future review of the
Board will be more favorable, the Federal Circuit consistently
reverses the GSBCA on jurisdictional grounds. This places the
GSBCA in the position of having to judge narrowly its protest juris-
diction, or to subject itself to reversals by the Federal Circuit. In
other areas concerning bid protests, such as defining who is an in-
terested party or determining the scope of the Board's authority to
impose sanctions, the GSBCA awaits further clarification by the Fed-
eral Circuit.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 8.
212. Id. at 6.
213. Id.
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